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Abstract
This paper investigates the behaviour in repeated decision situations. The experimental
study shows that subjects show low or no risk-aversion, but put very high value on the op-
portunity to sell the lottery in every stage of the decision problem. There is evidence that
risk attitudes depend on whether they are measured by comparing the certainty equivalent
and the expected value of a lottery or by preferences over mean-preserving spreads.
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1. Introduction
In an influential article on dynamic decision-making under uncertainty, 	
	
distinguishes static from dynamic choice situations according to whether a decision maker
has to determine his course of action irrevocably ’’before any of the alternative lotteries
(or stages of compound lotteries) are resolved’’ or whether the choice ’’involves deci-
sions that are made after the resolution of some uncertainty’’ (p. 1632). From a purely
decision-theoretic point of view, it appears unreasonable that a decision maker should
be influenced by information, if the action cannot be conditioned on this information.
Dynamic choice situations are characterized precisely by the opportunity to act on infor-
mation which becomes available in the course of the resolution of uncertainty. In this
context, Machina suggests a notion of dynamic consistency which does take into account
non-consequentialist behaviour as is implied by various non-expected utility models. Dy-
namic consistency requires an agent, after receiving some information, to choose an action
which is optimal relative to all acts that have the same history.
Experimental studies of dynamic decision-making have found substantial evidence that
the timing of the resolution of uncertainty has an impact on dynamic decision-making
even if the agents know that they cannot act on the information revealed over time. In
an experimental study designed to test alternative theories of dynamic decision-making,
    		
 find consistent violation of the principle of
timing independence. The principle of timing independence requires a decision maker’s
choice of action to be independent of information which does not affect the relative like-
lihood of the outcomes from their choice. Cubitt, Starmer, and Sugden find that subjects
are less risk-averse if they are allowed to condition their actions on the irrelevant event.
   		 find that decision makers invest significantly less in
situations where they can re-adjust their investment after each random draw. Moreover,
the overall performance of investors with flexibility to adjust was substantially worse than
the results obtained by the investors without this option. Following  !
"  # 		 Gneezy and Potters attribute this behaviour to
myopic loss aversion.
From the theoretical perspective, it is not obvious how a decision maker should invest in
the experimental situation of Gneezy and Potters. Even an expected-utility-maximising
agent might behave differently when she cannot adjust her investment in the light of up-
coming information compared to a situation where this is possible. Two issues are impor-
tant. If there is no adjustment possible, one is essentially in a situation of static decision-
making. In such cases, an expected utility maximiser values a sequence of lotteries as a
compound lottery. In contrast, if investment can be adjusted after information becomes
available then, depending on risk attitudes and resulting changes in wealth, the decision
may be modified.
In this study, we try to gain more insight in the principles guiding agents’ behaviour in
dynamic choice situations. Repeating an independent random draw has in itself a risk-
reducing diversification effect. This may partly explain the observed tendency to invest
more in a risky asset if a decision maker has to commit the investment over several con-
secutive periods (see the early anecdotic evidence of Samuelson, 1963). In contrast, the
possibility to make investments in successive periods offers the agent an opportunity to
2
wait for additional information which may help to avoid future losses. Thus, risk-averse
subjects may actually prefer this option, even if they do better on average without it. The
experiment in this study is designed to shed new light on these issues.
The question of how decision makers view and evaluate successive choices is of particular
relevance for the design of experiments itself. When accounting for experimental results
(see  		$ for a survey), one almost always applies the model of risky
decision making to the basic decision task and not to the repeated situation, although
repeating the same risky choices may weaken the effects of different risk attitudes. In
our study the crucial stochastic event occurs either once or twice and it is explicitly taken
into account how optimal behaviour depends on risk attitude. We want to test whether the
smaller variance of the final payoff expectations in the once repeated situation influences
actual behaviour as predicted by theory.
Our experiment studies decision makers’ evaluations for a two–period payoff depending
on just one or two chance moves. In a third treatment participants have the option to trade
the lottery after the first stage. With this design, we hope to gain in-sights about
 whether subjects understand the diversification effect of a repeated lottery,
 how they react to information revealed depending on whether they are allowed to act
on this information, and
 how they value the option to sell the second stage of a lottery in the light of the first-
stage results.
In Treatment A participants are endowed with a lottery  which pays with equal prob-
ability a high premium    and a low premium    where     . What they
actually have to choose is the limit price  above which they are willing to sell the lot-
tery. If the randomly selected price  for  exceeds , the participant gets the price  in
exchange for the lottery . Otherwise, the lottery is played and the participant receives
the prize. Clearly, the only dominant strategy is to bid the price at which one is indifferent
between selling and not selling the lottery (see %! &  !
	’(). In essence, we apply the incentive compatible random price mechanism to elicit
the willingness to accept for the basic lottery . The limit price  is the only decision
of a participant.
In Treatment B, the only decision is again the limit price  for which one is willing to sell
the repeated lottery. Here the lottery yields the sum of the returns from two successive
and independent draws of the prizes  and . The return from the repeated lottery is now
   and   , each with probability 

, and    with probability 

.
Treatment C has also two chance moves but a participant is free to sell the lottery in the
first and the second stage. More specifically, participants first choose a limit price  for
which they would be willing to sell the repeated lottery. If the random price is such that
no sale occurs, then the first lottery drawing is carried out. Knowing the payoff from this
first stage,  or , participants choose a second limit price  for which they would be
willing to sell the final stage of the lottery.
In summary, the basic decision in Treatment A elicits the certainty equivalent for the basic
lottery and hence the risk premium of the risky investment. Treatment B determines the
certainty equivalent for the once repeated lottery. Finally, Treatment C elicits the certainty
3
equivalents of the second-stage lottery and the willingness to accept for the two-stage
lottery with this additional sales option.
The experiment used a between-subject-design where each group of participants encoun-
ters only a single treatment and a within-subject-design where participants confront the
choice situations of all three treatments.
In the following section, we derive the optimal decisions for all three treatments. Section
3 contains the details of our experimental procedure. The main results are described and
discussed in section 4. We conclude by summarising our results and comparing them to
some previous experimental studies.
2. Optimal decisions
The experiment elicits the value of the lottery by using the random price mechanism
(%! & ! 	’() for which it is a dominant strategy to
reveal the certainty equivalent of a lottery. In each treatment, subjects were endowed with
a lottery and asked to name a price above which they would sell the lottery. A randomly
selected price then determined whether a subject could sell the lottery.
Three treatments are considered. Treatment A assesses the subject’s attitude towards risk.
Treatment B is similar to Treatment A but allows us to check whether participants under-
stand the diversification effect of a repeated lottery and whether they are influenced by
decision-irrelevant information. Treatment C studies the value of the additional option to
sell the lottery after partial resolution of uncertainty.
The basic payoff of a lottery is
   with probability 

   with probability 


This lottery is repeated once in Treatments B and C. Outcomes are doubled in Treatment
A where the basic lottery is played only once. Treatment C allows players to trade the
second-stage lottery after the outcome of stage 1 has been observed. The following table
summarises the structure of the three treatments.
chance moves take place
decisions
take place
once twice
once Treatment A Treatment B
twice - Treatment C
In order to contrast the experimental results with theoretical predictions, we determine
the optimal behaviour of an expected utility maximiser in the three treatments.
2.1 Treatment A
In Treatment A, subjects are endowed with the following lottery:
1 

     with probability 

     with probability 


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Mean and standard deviation of lottery 1 are
  	 and   

Subjects are asked to quote a price     for which they are willing to sell lottery
1. A price     is then randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. For   
the lottery 1 is sold and the payoff of the subject is  For    the lottery 1 is
played and the subject receives the lottery payout. The following diagram illustrates the
sequence of moves.





       
    
    

  
  




Figure 1: Treatment A
The expected utility from quoting a sales price  is easily computed as
	  

    
  

   








 
Straightforward calculation shows that 	 is a concave function if the von Neumann–
Morgenstern utility index 
 is a strictly increasing function.
In this treatment, subjects face the decision problem:
Choose     such that 	 is maximised.
Differentiating 	 yields the following first order condition which is also sufficient
because 	 is concave:

    
  

 
  
It is optimal for the decision maker to offer the certainty equivalent of the lottery as limit
price for which the lottery will be sold. Solving for  yields the optimal quote for the
sales price:
  



    
  

  


  



It is worth noting that the expected utility of the lottery plus sales option exceeds the
expected value of the basic lottery. In case of 
   (risk neutrality) one obtains
  	 and 	  	 which is higher than the lottery’s expected value of 	 due to the
additional expected gains from random prices larger than 	
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2.2 Treatment B
In Treatment B, lottery 1 is once repeated:
2 


     with probability 

   	 with probability 

     with probability 


As mean and standard deviation of the compound lottery 2 one obtains
  	   and  

  


Note that lottery 1 is a mean-preserving spread of lottery 2.
As in Treatment A, subjects are asked to quote a price     for which they would
be willing to sell the lottery 2. The price     is randomly drawn from a uniform
distribution. For    the lottery 2 is sold and the payoff of the subject is  For
   the lottery2 is played and the subject receives the lottery payout. The following
diagram illustrates this scenario.
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Figure 2: Treatment B
Maintaining the assumption that decision makers are expected utility maximisers, one
computes easily the expected utility from a quoted price  
	 



 
      
   
     








 
	 is concave if 
 is a strictly increasing function. The first-order conditions of the
problem,
choose     such that 	 is maximised,
are necessary and sufficient:



 
      
   
   
  
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One obtains again a limit price equal to the certainty equivalent of lottery 2,
  





 
      
   
  
 




 
    
	  

Comparing the optimal bids in Treatments A and B, it is not difficult to show the following
properties:
 For risk-averse decision makers, 
 strictly concave,
	    

 and 	  	
follows, since 1 is a mean-preserving spread of 2.
 In case of risk-neutral decision makers, 
   one obtains
	    

 and 	  	  	 
 For risk-loving agents, 
 strictly convex, we have
	    

 and 	  	
2.3 Treatment C
In Treatment C, subjects face a repeated lottery with the same payoffs as in2. In addition,
the participants have an opportunity to sell the lottery after the first stage. The endowment
of participants is the lottery
3 


     with probability 

   	 with probability 

     with probability 


with mean      and standard deviation      
In stage 1, the subjects quote a price     for which they are willing to sell the
lottery. A price     is then randomly drawn from a uniform distribution. For
   the lottery 3 is sold and the payoff of the subject is  For    the first stage
of the lottery 3 is played.
After observing the outcome of the first stage,    or    respectively, owners of
the lottery who have not sold the lottery in stage 1 can make a second sales offer at prices
   or    respectively. Again a price     is drawn from a uniform
distribution. For    (  ) the lottery is sold and the payoff of the subject is 
For    (  ) the second draw of the lottery 3 takes place and the respective
payoffs are realized. Figure 3 illustrates this choice situation.
One can determine the optimal limit prices working backward. Suppose the lottery was
not sold in stage 1. In Stage 2 a limit price  will be determined which may depend
on the previously realised result , i.e.,  or . The expected utility from quoting a price
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Figure 3: Treatment C
 is
		   

 
   
    






	

  
The optimisation problem,
choose     such that 		  is maximised,
yields the first-order condition


 
   
  
   
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Hence,
  




 
   
  
 



 
   
  
and
	     	

	 



 
   
   

 









	

  



 
   
   

 









	

  
Note that, for a risk-neutral participant with 
   the optimal bid    is
independent of  Moreover, due to the sales option, the second-stage lottery has a value
of 	      which is much higher than the expected value of  from the second-
stage lottery alone.
In Stage 1, an expected utility maximiser will choose the limit price such that
	 


 	    	   
 








 
is maximised. From the first-order condition,


 	    	   
  
one computes
  




 	    	  
It is possible not to sell the second-stage lottery by bidding sufficiently high. Hence, the
two-stage lottery2 is a choice option of the decision maker. Consequently,    must
be true. For a risk-neutral decision maker with 
  , e.g., the optimal bid   
exceeds   	 and also lottery 3 ’s certainty equivalent of 	 In fact, one can show
  

 This extra-value of lottery 3 is a consequence of the additional sales option
in stage 2. The following proposition summarises the comparison of bids. The proof is
straight forward and omitted.
Proposition 2.1 1. If decision makers are
 risk-averse, then 	    
 risk-neutral, then 	    
 risk-loving, then 	    
2. For any attitude towards risk,
  


9
The high optimal bids in Treatment C reflect the chances of extra profits from the sales
mechanism with randomly chosen prices. Decision makers of any risk attitude will like
these extra chances.
2.4 Hypotheses
Based on the assumption that decision makers are expected utility maximisers with uni-
form curvature of the von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index 
 our theoretical analy-
sis leads us to propose the following hypotheses :
1. Expected utility:
 Either 	    , (risk-aversion )
 or 	    , (risk-neutrality )
 or 	    . (risk-preference )
2. Consistency of risk attitudes:
Risk attitudes do not depend on whether they are measured by
– the difference between certainty equivalent and expected value,   	   or
– preferences over mean-preserving spreads,     
3. Valuation of flexibility:
The option to sell the second-stage lottery is valued extremely high.
Our experimental design should allow us to check these hypotheses. In contrast to non-
expected utility theories, expected utility implies that risk-averse individuals have a cer-
tainty equivalent below the expected value of the lottery and a preference for less dis-
persed distributions in the sense of mean-preserving spreads. It will be interesting to see
whether participants of the experiment will value the extra chances inherent in the sales
mechanism as high as the theory predicts.
3. Experimental procedure
The experimental sessions were carried out at the Humboldt University in Berlin in Jan-
uary 1999. Participants were students of economics from a large first-year microeco-
nomics course. For each session, a group of 40 students was recruited. In addition to
performing the experimental task, participants were asked to fill in a questionnaire as-
sessing their understanding of the experimental procedure. In order to control for effects
due to the novelty of the situation, each treatment was repeated a second time without
prior announcement.
Three groups of students participated only in a single treatment. We refer to these groups
as ’between-subjects’ experiments. A fourth group of students would make decisions
on all three treatments. We refer to this group as ’within-subjects’ experiments. This
group offers the opportunity to study consistency of risk attitudes and behaviour across
treatments.
A group of 40 students was confronted with the one-stage lottery (Treatment A). A second
group of 39 students attended the experiment of Treatment B. A third group of 38 students
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was subject to Treatment C.
The group of 40 participants in the ’’within-subject’’ experiment was split in two sub-
groups of 20 participants. For the first group of 20, earnings of all three treatments were
actually paid. For the second group, the threefold earnings of one randomly selected treat-
ment was paid out. This distinction was made in order to check whether the wide-spread
practice of paying out only one randomly selected outcome would affect the participants’
behaviour.
4. Results
Two types of results will be distinguished in this section. Firstly, we will deal with the
question of whether the observed behaviour is consistent with theoretical predictions
based on expected utility theory. These theoretical predictions were derived and formu-
lated in three hypotheses in section 2. In a separate subsection, we will reconsider our
results as to their implications for the design of decision-making experiments.
4.1 Risk attitudes and valuation of the resale option
a) Risk attitudes
Risk attitudes of expected utility maximisers can be tested either
 by comparing the certainty equivalent of a lottery with its expected value or
 by studying their preference over mean-preserving spreads.
Denote by  the certainty equivalent of lottery  and by  a mean-preserving
spread of lottery  If a decision maker’s preferences satisfy the expected utility hy-
pothesis1, then the following preference pattern must hold:
risk attitude certainty equivalent mean-preserving spread
risk-averse    and   
risk-neutral    and   
risk-loving    and   
Moreover,      for risk-averse participants, while the reverse in-
equalities must hold for risk-loving decision makers.
Examining the average bids for the one-stage lottery in Treatment A, we find values of
	 and 	 in the first round (Table 1) and 	 and 	
 in the second round (Table 2).
On first sight, this suggests that the participants were risk neutral with a slight tendency
towards risk-loving behaviour.2 This overall risk neutrality is confirmed by the results for
the mode and median in this treatment. The average bids for the lotteries with a reduced
variance in treatment B, their modes and medians support also this picture. Risk neutrality
 Note that these two indicators for the risk attitude do no longer lead to the same classification, if the
decision maker’s preferences do not satisfy the expected utility hypothesis.
 Since we elicit the willingness to accept rather than the one to pay, the fact that average bids are sightly
larger than the monetary expectation of the lottery could be caused by an endowment or status quo–effect
(see Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988).
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Method Treatm. Mean Median Mode Std.dev. Min Max N
bet-  6.17 6.0 6.0 1.61 1.0 10.0 40
ween  6.10 6.0 6.0 1.24 2.9 10.0 39
subjects  7.31 7.5 6.0 1.35 5.0 9.9 38
with-  6.38 6.0 6.0 1.51 2.5 10.0 40
in  6.60 6.3 6.0 1.67 1.0 10.0 40
subjects  7.74 8.0 6.0 1.60 4.7 10.0 40
Table 1: First-round results for initial bids.
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Method Treatm. Mean Median Mode Std.dev. Min Max N
bet-  6.32 6.0 6.0 1.87 2.7 10.0 40
ween  6.00 6.0 6.0 1.56 1.0 10.0 39
subjects  7.44 7.7 8.0 1.58 3.5 10.0 38
with-  6.34 6.0 6.0 1.58 3.0 10.0 40
in  6.28 6.0 6.0 1.40 1.0 10.0 40
subjects  7.37 7.25 6.0 1.60 4.0 10.0 40
Table 2: Second-round results for initial bids.
would predict a bid of exactly 	 in both treatments A and B. The null-hypothesis of equal
bid distributions for treatments A and B in first-round bids of the between-subjects design
cannot be rejected in a two-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test (  ).
This picture of a risk-neutral population of participants is put into question by the compar-
ison of the means of bids in treatments A and B. Except for the first round of the within-
subjects case, average bids are slightly higher for the more dispersed lottery in Treatment
A. This indicates risk-loving behaviour. Though the exceptional within-subjects case may
be viewed as suggesting a risk-averse preference for a smaller variance, a one-tailed
Wilcoxon-test of the null-hypothesis that the bid distribution in treatment A is concen-
trated on lower bids than in treatment B in the first round can be rejected at the 10 percent
level (  
). The comparison of treatments A and B supports the view of a slightly
risk-loving population of participants.
The slightly conflicting assessment of the participants’ risk attitudes, depending on whether
the risk attitude is measured by divergence of the certainty-equivalent bid from the ex-
pected value of the lottery or by the preferences over mean-preserving spreads, suggests
a closer look at the risk attitudes displayed in the choices of treatments A and B.
b) Consistency of risk attitudes
In order to gain more insight into the participants’ risk attitudes, we classify the risk
attitude of participants in the within-subjects design according to the certainty-equivalent
bid and according to their preferences over mean-preserving spreads. When investigating
how many participants were consistent in their risk attitudes, we do not want to rely on
small numerical variations in the bids but on rather broad classifications. We will classify
a decision maker as risk neutral if the bid in Treatment A,  falls into an interval
      Similarly, a subject submitting a bid in Treatment B,  in the
interval of  around        will be classified as risk-neutral.
The deviation of 
 corresponds to approximately 6 percent of the total variation of
payoffs. The following table summarises this classification.
risk averse risk neutral risk loving
       	 	  
                
A cross tabulation according to this classification for both groups of the participants in
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preferences for diversification
certainty-
equivalent
based
risk averse risk neutral risk loving 
risk averse    
risk neutral    
risk loving 
   
    

Table 3: Cross tabulation of risk attitude classifications: first round
the within-subjects treatments is given in Tables 3 and 4. Table 3 tests the consistency of
the measurement of risk attitudes in the first round of the within-subjects case.
About one third of the participants will be ranked as risk averse according to a certainty-
equivalent bid below the expected value but only five participants were considered as risk
averse based on their preference for greater diversification. In general, the preference for
the more risky lottery was stronger than the ranking according to the certainty-equivalent
bid would suggest.
Most striking is the fact that only a quarter of the participants (11 subjects) were ranked
consistently by the two measures. A surprisingly large number of subjects (9 participants)
had a certainty-equivalent bid below the expected value of the lottery but did strictly
prefer the riskier lottery in Treatment A. This casts doubt on whether the two measures
of uncertainty aversion capture the same behaviour.
Table 4 cross tabulates the classification of risk preferences according to preference for di-
versification and according to the certainty equivalent for the second round of the within-
subjects treatment.
The second round shows a more consistent picture. Over 50 percent of the group (21
subjects) are now ranked the same way by the two measures. Moreover, the extremely
inconsistent behaviour of risk-averse subjects according to the certainty-equivalent bid
preferring the riskier lottery has nearly disappeared. This could be interpreted as if sub-
jects would need some experience with the treatment before understanding completely
the implications of the scenario.
The effect of experience is also reflected in significantly lower bids in the repetition of
treatments B and C for the pooled data of the within-subjects design (  
 for Treat-
ment B and    for first-stage bids in Treatment C in a one-tailed Wilcoxon-test.).
Consistency of the two measures for attitudes toward risk requires some understanding
of the concept of a mean-preserving spread. Consistency over the two rounds in terms of
certainty-equivalent bids does not rely on such skills. This consistency can also be tested
preferences for diversification
certainty-
equivalent
based
risk averse risk neutral risk loving 
risk averse    
risk neutral    
risk loving   
 

   	 

Table 4: Cross tabulation of risk attitude classifications: second round
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second round
first round
risk averse risk neutral risk loving 
risk averse    
risk neutral    
risk loving    

   	 

Table 5: Cross tabulation of risk attitude in Treatment A: first vs second round
for the between-subjects treatments.
Consider first the between-subjects results of Treatment A (see Table 5). In this case, 60
percent of the participants (24 subjects) are consistent in their attitudes towards risk. The
dominant risk attitude appears to be risk-loving behaviour. In Treatment B, the degree
of consistency is even greater. In contrast to Treatment A however, 50 percent of the
participants can be ranked as risk-neutral (see Table 6).
c) Preference for resale option
In Treatment C, decision makers could sell the second stage of their lottery, if they had
not sold the whole lottery in stage 1. Though this lottery resembles the one in Treatment
B, the experimental results shows a completely different picture. Due to the second sale
option after stage 1, decision makers could profit twice from randomly chosen prices.
Our theoretical considerations in section 2 suggest that decision makers will value high
the extra option to sell. Indeed, for all types of risk preferences, the first bid in Treatment
C should exceed the bid in Treatment B. In the case of risk neutrality, the first bid should
be as high as 
Indeed, the experimental results show high first-stage bids in Treatment C. While the av-
erage bid was close to 	 in treatments A and B, it was between  and 
 in Treatment
C (Table 1). The median was similarly upward biased, while the mode remained at the
expected value   	. This suggests a strong positive valuation for the additional sales
option.
These observations are confirmed by statistical tests of the null hypothesis of higher bids
in Treatment C. In the first round of Treatment C, the distribution of first-stage bids is
significantly more concentrated on higher bids than in the first rounds of treatments A
and B. Using a one-tailed Mann-Whitney U-test for the between-subjects data yields  
 for Treatment C vs. Treatment A and    for treatment C vs. Treatment B.
For the within-subjects data, a one-tailed Wilcoxon-test resulted also in    both for
Treatment C vs. Treatment A and for Treatment C vs. Treatment B.
second round
first round
risk averse risk neutral risk loving 
risk averse 	   
risk neutral    

risk loving   	 
    
Table 6: Cross tabulation of risk attitude in Treatment B: first vs second round
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Round Method Type of bid Mean Median Mode Std.dev. Min Max N
1st between  4.14 4.7 5.0 1.33 1.0 6.0 14
subjects  4.74 4.9 3.0 1.52 2.5 7.5 15
within  5.56 5.0 4.0 2.05 3.0 10.0 16
subjects  4.75 5.0 5.0 1.65 1.0 8.2 24
2nd between  3.94 4.0 3.0 1.54 1.1 6.6 16
subjects  3.86 4.0 5.0 1.21 2.4 5.0 8
within  4.89 5.0 5.0 1.83 1.0 7.49 14
subjects  5.97 5.5 5.0 1.99 3.0 10.0 12
Table 7: Second-stage bids in treatment C.
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competence level

        

Treatment A     
  
  
Treatment B 
        
Treatment C         
Table 8: Competence of participants.
Probably the most surprising feature of the results are, however, the bids in the second
stage of Treatment C. Table 7 shows mean bids ranging from 

 to  In the second-
stage lottery the expected value equals  and the maximum payout from the lottery was
 The summary statistics in Table 7 suggest an extremely risk-loving attitude towards
risk. The frequency distributions show bids up to , double the maximum outcome of
the lottery. Such behaviour is inconsistent with expected utility theory, in fact with any
decision-theory which is purely consequentialist. In order to explain bids which exceed
the maximum payoff of a lottery, a decision maker has to have an intrinsic preference for
gambling.
Of course, participants who did not sell in stage 1 were those with the highest bids in
period 1. Thus, there is a selection bias towards more risk-loving participants. Hence, it
should not surprise to find more risk-loving behaviour in the group of second-stage bid-
ders. Yet, bidding more than the maximum amount that could be obtained in the second-
stage lottery cannot be reconciled with standard decision theories which insist on valuing
only outcomes.
The results of Table 7 reveal no clear wealth effect. A one-sided Wilcoxon test of the
null hypothesis of a higher bid distribution after a low payoff  is not supported by the
data. There is also no hint of the ’’gambler’s effect’’ of an increased expectation of a high
outcome in consequence of a low outcome in stage 1.
d) Competence of participants
The discrepancies in the risk preferences of participants when measured by certainty
equivalents or preferences over mean-preserving spreads suggest to check the answers
to the questionnaires in order to see whether participants did understand the implications
of the different lotteries. The questionnaire posed four questions related to the outcome of
the lottery and the payoff obtainable from a bid for two results of the draws in the lottery
and from the price distribution. Competence of the participant was measured by the sum
of the scores of the four questions, where a correct answer was given a mark of , a false
answer a mark of  and no answer was given 
Table 8 shows the relationship between competence levels between 
, all answers were
correct, and 
, no answer was correct, and the percentage of subjects within the same
competence group who were consistent in their risk attitudes across rounds.
Table 8 shows only a slight positive relationship between the degree of understanding of
the lotteries and of the sales mechanism and the degree of consistency in risk attitudes. We
conclude from this that incompetence about the lotteries and the sales mechanism cannot
account for the observed inconsistencies in the classification of risk attitudes.
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4.2 Methodological issues
Several implications for the design of experiments can be drawn from our observations.
a) Between- vs within-subjects data
Do participants react significantly to ’method’ , i.e. to be confronted with only one task
(A, B, or C) or to all three tasks? When testing this hypothesis we rely on the pooled
data of the within-subjects design. At the one-percent level homogeneity of the between-
subjects and the within-subjects distributions cannot be rejected for treatments A, B, and
(first-stage bids) C. At the five-percent level the (on average negative) difference of first-
round bids in treatment B when comparing between- with within-subjects data is signif-
icant. In our view, such weak confirmation for one of the altogether six comparisons
should not be overrated. Whatever can be learned from our data is supported by both, the
between-subjects and the within-subjects data.
b) Effect of random payout
In the within-subjects experiments, half of the 40 participants (group 1) were paid for all
three tasks whereas the other half was paid only for one randomly selected task A, B, or
C. To provide similar monetary incentives for these groups, the randomly selected payoff
was tripled.
Comparing the bid distributions of first- and second-round bids in case of treatment A
reveals only one weak (  
 effect in case of first-stage bids in the first round of
treatment C. In our view, such a weak effect for one of altogether eight comparisons (we
have pooled the second-period bids  and  in treatment C) does not question our former
analysis which disregarded the different payment regimes in case of treatment C and the
within-subject design (see     		
, who report pos-
itive effects of deterministic versus stochastic payment for a different, but related task).
c) The random price mechanism for eliciting certainty equivalents
In a recent study, % )   		 found that the BDM
mechanism is sensitive to the support of the price distribution. In particular, the maxi-
mum price possible appears to be important for the results of the mechanism. To avoid
such effects in our experiment, the random price  in stage 2 of Treatment C was selected
from the same interval   as the price  in stage 1. The extreme overbidding observed
in stage 2 of Treatment C may be an unintended consequence of this design choice. Ret-
rospectively, it appears possible that the fact that a price of  was possible in stage 2
may have biased upward the bids of the participants. Such a bias may, of course, have
influenced also bids in the other treatments.
5. Concluding remarks
We can summarise our main findings by the following effects:
1. Subjects show risk-neutrality or risk-loving behaviour.
2. Consistency in risk attitudes across repetitions and for different measures of risk atti-
tudes is limited.
3. Subjects show a strong preference for a second sale option.
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4. Subjects bid unreasonably high in second sale.
A noticeable result of our experiment is the observation that, in this simple lottery context,
the behaviour of most participants appears to be consistent with expected utility theory and
risk-loving or risk-neutral preferences. It is also consistent with expected utility theory
that bids in stage 1 of Treatment C were significantly higher than bids in Treatment B. In
these respects expected utility theory appears to be sufficiently flexible to explain these
observations.
Other results of our experiment are harder to reconcile with expected utility theory. For
example, the overbidding in stage 2 of Treatment C is incompatible not only with expected
utility theory but with any purely consequentialist explanation.
There are, of course, competing explanations for some of our observations. The risk-
loving behaviour could also be explained by an endowment effect. Inconsistency in the
risk preferences across treatments could be due to people who are variety seeking not
only in consumption, but also in risk taking. The unreasonable high bids in stage 2 of
Treatment C may be a consequence of the sensitivity of the random price mechanism to
the maximum price in the random price distribution.
Altogether it is promising to continue this research, e.g. by collecting larger sets of deci-
sion data and by allowing for more experience. However, this would mean to perform an
experiment with many repetitions, but to pay only one randomly selected round. Other-
wise a repeated experiment might be seen as offering the same chances as our Treatment
B as compared to Treatment A.
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Appendix
A.1 Instructions
1. Treatment A
ANLEITUNG A
Willkommen zu unserem Experiment! Bitte lesen Sie diese Anleitung sorgfältig durch! Sprechen Sie nicht mit Ihren
Nachbarn und behalten Sie Ruhe während des gesamten Experiments! Falls Sie Fragen haben, melden Sie sich! Wir
kommen dann zu Ihnen.
In diesem Experiment werden Sie einige wenige Entscheidungen zu treffen haben. Wieviel Geld Sie hierdurch endgültig
verdienen, hängt nur von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen sowie von Zufallsereignissen ab.
Sie haben die Möglichkeit an einer Lotterie teilzunehmen, die in den Perioden 1 und 2 entweder DM 5.00 oder DM
1.00 auszahlt. Wie wird entschieden, welche der Auszahlungen die Lotterie in den beiden Perioden generiert ?
Sie werden dazu einmal würfeln:
 Sie gewinnen in Periode 1 und 2 jeweils DM 5.00, wenn Sie eine gerade Augenzahl würfeln.
 Sie gewinnen in Periode 1 und 2 jeweils DM 1.00, wenn Sie eine ungerade Augenzahl würfeln.
Sie können nun diese Lotterie behalten und an ihr teilnehmen oder sie an uns (die Experimentatoren) verkaufen.
Wie können Sie die Lotterie verkaufen, falls Sie dies wollen?
Dazu müssen Sie eine untere Preisschranke  festlegen (mu zwischen DM 1.00 und DM 10.00 liegen). Sie verkaufen
dann die Lotterie zu einem zufällig ausgewählten Preis , falls  größer als Ihre Preisschranke  ist. Anderenfalls
behalten Sie die Lotterie und nehmen an ihr teil. Der Preis  wird zufällig im Bereich aller Preise von
DM 1.10, DM 1.20, . . . , DM 9.90, DM 10.00 ()
ausgewählt.
Bitte beachten Sie, daIhre Preisschranke  nicht den Preis  festlegt, zu dem Sie die Lotterie verkaufen, sondern nur
das Intervall (    DM 10.00) der Preise , zu denen Sie zum Verkauf der Lotterie bereit sind. Die für Sie
beste Preisschranke  ist damit der Preis , bei dem Ihnen Verkauf und Nichtverkauf der Lotterie als gleich günstig
erscheinen.
Beachten Sie weiterhin, daSie durch die Wahl von   DM 10.00 sicherstellen können, da Sie die Lotterie, egal
welcher Preis  zufällig ausgewählt wird, stets behalten. Durch die Wahl von   DM 1.00 können Sie hingegegen
sicherstellen, daSie die Lotterie in jedem Fall verkaufen.
Zum besseren Verständnis der Regeln, wird im folgenden noch einmal die Abfolge der Ereignisse genau aufgelistet:
1. Sie legen Ihre untere Preisschranke  fest.
(Wie oben erläutert, ist dies die Preisschranke, oberhalb derer Sie bereit sind, die Lotterie an uns zu verkaufen.)
2. Der Preis  wird zufällig ausgewählt.
(Zu diesem Zweck wird in eine Urne mit Chips gegriffen, auf denen die Preise  wie unter () stehen.)
3. Falls   , verkaufen Sie die Lotterie an uns. Ihre Auszahlung beträgt in diesem Fall DM .
4. Falls   , behalten Sie die Lotterie und nehmen an ihr teil. Diese wird dann ausgespielt, indem Sie einmal
würfeln. In diesem Fall erhalten Sie die Auszahlung der Lotterie wie oben beschrieben.
Die Entscheidung erfolgt auf einem separaten Formular, das wir gleich an alle Teilnehmer austeilen.
Sie bekommen eine Codenummer, damit Ihre Anonymität uns gegenüber erhalten bleibt. Ihre Codekarte heben Sie
bitte gut auf, denn nur gegen ihre Vorlage werden Sie später Ihre Auszahlung erhalten.
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2. Treatment B
ANLEITUNG B
Willkommen zu unserem Experiment! Bitte lesen Sie diese Anleitung sorgfältig durch! Sprechen Sie nicht mit Ihren
Nachbarn und behalten Sie Ruhe während des gesamten Experiments! Falls Sie Fragen haben, melden Sie sich! Wir
kommen dann zu Ihnen.
In diesem Experiment werden Sie einige wenige Entscheidungen zu treffen haben. Wieviel Geld Sie hierdurch endgültig
verdienen, hängt nur von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen sowie von Zufallsereignissen ab.
Sie haben die Möglichkeit an einer Lotterie teilzunehmen, die in den Perioden 1 und 2 entweder DM 5.00 oder DM
1.00 auszahlt. Wie wird entschieden, welche der Auszahlungen die Lotterie in den beiden Perioden generiert ?
Sie werden dazu zweimal hintereinander würfeln.
Sie gewinnen jeweils DM 5.00, wenn Sie eine gerade Augenzahl würfeln.
 Sie gewinnen jeweils DM 1.00, wenn Sie eine ungerade Augenzahl würfeln.
 Sie können nun diese Lotterie behalten und an ihr teilnehmen oder sie an uns (die Experimentatoren) verkaufen.
Wie können Sie die Lotterie verkaufen, falls Sie dies wollen?
Dazu müssen Sie eine untere Preisschranke  festlegen (mu zwischen DM 1.00 und DM 10.00 liegen). Sie verkaufen
dann die Lotterie zu einem zufällig ausgewählten Preis , falls  grö er als Ihre Preisschranke  ist. Anderenfalls
behalten Sie die Lotterie und nehmen an ihr teil. Der Preis  wird zufällig im Bereich aller Preise von
DM 1.10, DM 1.20, . . . , DM 9.90, DM 10.00 ()
ausgewählt.
Bitte beachten Sie, daIhre Preisschranke  nicht den Preis  festlegt, zu dem Sie die Lotterie verkaufen, sondern nur
das Intervall (    DM 10.00) der Preise , zu denen Sie zum Verkauf der Lotterie bereit sind. Die für Sie
beste Preisschranke  ist damit der Preis , bei dem Ihnen Verkauf und Nichtverkauf der Lotterie als gleich günstig
erscheinen.
Beachten Sie weiterhin, daSie durch die Wahl von   DM 10.00 sicherstellen können, da Sie die Lotterie, egal
welcher Preis  zufällig ausgewählt wird, stets behalten. Durch die Wahl von   DM 1.00 können Sie hingegegen
sicherstellen, daSie die Lotterie in jedem Fall verkaufen.
Zum besseren Verständnis der Regeln, wird im folgenden noch einmal die Abfolge der Ereignisse genau aufgelistet:
1. Sie legen Ihre untere Preisschranke  fest.
(Wie oben erläutert, ist dies die Preisschranke, oberhalb derer Sie bereit sind, die Lotterie an uns zu verkaufen.)
2. Der Preis  wird zufällig ausgewählt.
(Zu diesem Zweck wird in eine Urne mit Chips gegriffen, auf denen die Preise  wie unter () stehen.)
3. Falls   , verkaufen Sie die Lotterie an uns. Ihre Auszahlung beträgt in diesem Fall DM .
4. Falls   , behalten Sie die die Lotterie und nehmen an ihr teil. Diese wird dann ausgespielt, indem Sie zweimal
hintereinander würfeln. In diesem Fall erhalten Sie die Auszahlung der Lotterie wie oben beschrieben.
Die Entscheidung erfolgt auf einem separaten Formular, das wir gleich an alle Teilnehmer austeilen.
Sie bekommen eine Codenummer, damit Ihre Anonymität uns gegenüber erhalten bleibt. Ihre Codekarte heben Sie
bitte gut auf, denn nur gegen ihre Vorlage werden Sie später Ihre Auszahlung erhalten.
3. Treatmant C
ANLEITUNG C
Willkommen zu unserem Experiment! Bitte lesen Sie diese Anleitung sorgfältig durch! Sprechen Sie nicht mit Ihren
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Nachbarn und behalten Sie Ruhe während des gesamten Experiments! Falls Sie Fragen haben, melden Sie sich! Wir
kommen dann zu Ihnen.
In diesem Experiment werden Sie einige wenige Entscheidungen zu treffen haben. Wieviel Geld Sie hierdurch endgültig
verdienen, hängt nur von Ihren eigenen Entscheidungen sowie von Zufallsereignissen ab.
Sie haben die Möglichkeit an einer Lotterie teilzunehmen, die in den Perioden 1 und 2 entweder DM 5.00 oder DM
1.00 auszahlt. Wie wird entschieden, welche der Auszahlungen die Lotterie in den beiden Perioden generiert ?
Sie werden dazu zweimal hintereinander würfeln.
 Sie gewinnen jeweils DM 5.00, wenn Sie eine gerade Augenzahl würfeln.
 Sie gewinnen jeweils DM 1.00, wenn Sie eine ungerade Augenzahl würfeln.
Sie können nun diese Lotterie behalten und an ihr teilnehmen oder sie an uns (die Experimentatoren) verkaufen.
Wie können Sie die Lotterie verkaufen, falls sie dies wollen?
Sie können zunächst die gesamte Lotterie verkaufen. Dazu müssen Sie eine untere Preisschranke  festlegen ( mu
zwischen DM 1.00 und DM 10.00 liegen). Sie verkaufen dann die gesamte Lotterie zu einem zufällig ausgewählten
Preis , falls  größer als Ihre Preisschranke  ist. Anderenfalls behalten Sie die Lotterie und nehmen am ersten
Würfeln teil. Der Preis  wird zufällig im Bereich aller Preise von
DM 1.10, DM 1.20, . . . , DM 9.90, DM 10.00 ()
ausgewählt.
Haben Sie die gesamte Lotterie nicht verkauft, so können Sie nach dem ersten Würfeln, nochmals, Ihre Gewin-
nansprüche aus dem zweiten Würfeln verkaufen. Dies läuft genau nach den gleichen Regeln wie oben ab.
Bitte beachten Sie, daIhre Preisschranke  nicht den Preis  festlegt, zu dem Sie die gesamte Lotterie (bzw. Ihre
Gewinnansprüche aus dem zweiten Würfeln) verkaufen, sondern nur das Intervall (   DM 10.00) der Preise,
zu denen Sie zum Verkauf der gesamten Lotterie (bzw. zum Verkauf Ihrer Gewinnansprüche aus dem zweiten Würfeln)
bereit sind. Die für Sie beste Preisschranke  ist damit der Preis , bei dem Ihnen Verkauf und Nichtverkauf als gleich
günstig erscheinen.
Beachten Sie weiterhin, daSie jeweils durch die Wahl von   DM 10.00 sicherstellen können, da Sie Ihre Gewin-
nansprüche aus jedem Würfeln, egal welcher Preis  zufällig ausgewählt wird, stets behalten. Durch die Wahl von
  DM 1.00 können Sie hingegen sicherstellen, da Sie die gesamte Lotterie (bzw. Ihre Gewinnansprüche aus dem
zweiten Würfeln) in jedem Fall verkaufen.
Zum besseren Verständnis der Regeln, wird im folgenden noch einmal die Abfolge der Ereignisse genau aufgelistet:
1. Sie legen Ihre untere Preisschranke  für die gesamte Lotterie fest.
(Wie oben erläutert, ist dies die Preisschranke, oberhalb derer Sie bereit sind, die gesamte Lotterie an uns zu
verkaufen.)
2. Ein Preis  wird zufällig ausgewählt.
(Zu diesem Zweck wird in eine Urne mit Chips gegriffen, auf denen die Preise  wie unter () stehen.)
3. Falls   , verkaufen Sie die gesamte Lotterie an uns. Ihre Auszahlung beträgt in diesem Fall DM  und das
Experiment endet.
4. Falls   , behalten Sie die Lotterie und das Experiment wird fortgesetzt. Die erste Periode der Lotterie wird
dann ausgespielt, indem Sie einmal würfeln. Die entsprechenden Auszahlungen sind Ihre Gewinne aus der ersten
Periode.
5. Sie können nun Ihre Gewinnansprüche aus dem zweiten Würfeln verkaufen, in dem Sie nun nochmals eine untere
Preisschranke  festlegen.
6. Ein zweiter Preis  wird zufällig bestimmt.
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7. Falls   , verkaufen Sie Ihre Gewinnansprüche aus dem zweiten Würfeln an uns. Ihre Auszahlung beträgt in
diesem Fall DM  zuzüglich Ihrer Gewinne in der ersten Periode.
8. Falls   , behalten Sie die Gewinnansprüche aus dem zweiten Würfeln. Die zweite Periode der Lotterie wird
dann ausgespielt, indem Sie nochmals würfeln. Ihre Auszahlung ist dann die Summe der entsprechenden Gewinne
aus dem ersten und dem zweiten Würfeln.
Die Entscheidung(en) erfolgt auf einem separaten Formular, das wir gleich an alle Teilnehmer austeilen.
Sie bekommen eine Codenummer, damit Ihre Anonymität uns gegenüber erhalten bleibt. Ihre Codekarte heben Sie
bitte gut auf, denn nur gegen ihre Vorlage werden Sie später Ihre Auszahlung erhalten.
4. English Translation
Instructions for Treatment A [B]:
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your neighbours and keep quiet
during the entire experiment. If you have a question, give notice. We will then come to you.
In this experiment you will have to make a few decisions. How much money you will finally earn depends on your
own decisions as well as on chance moves.
You have the opportunity to participate in a lottery which pays in periods 1 and 2 either DM 5.00 or DM 1.00. How is
decided which of the payoffs the lottery generates in both periods?
You will throw a die once [twice].
 You win in period 1 and 2 DM 5.00 if the die shows an even number.
[You win DM 5.00 each time the die shows an even number.]
 You win in period 1 and 2 DM 1.00 if the die shows an odd number.
[You win DM 1.00 each time the die shows an odd number.]
You can now keep the lottery and participate in it or you can sell it to us (the experimenters).
How can you sell the lottery, in case you want to?
For this purpose you have to determine a lower price limit  ( has to lie between DM 1.00 and DM 10.00). You will
sell the lottery at a randomly chosen price , if  is larger than your price limit . Otherwise you will keep the lottery
and participate in it. The price  will be randomly selected from the set of all prices:
    
Please note that your price limit  does not determine the price at which you sell the lottery but the interval (   
DM 10.00) of prices , for which you are willing to sell the lottery. Therefore, the price limit optimal for you is the
price , at which selling and not selling the lottery appears equally favourable.
Please note further that by choosing   DM 10.00 you can ensure keeping the lottery independent of the randomly
drawn price. In contrast to this you can ensure to sell the lottery in any case by the choice of   DM 1.00.
For a better understanding of the rules the sequence of events is listed again:
1. You determine your lower price limit .
(As explained above, this is the price limit above which you are willing to
sell the lottery to us.
2. The price  is randomly selected.
(For this purpose, somebody will grab into a bowl with chips. The chips
carry the prices listed under .)
23
3. If   , you will sell the lottery to us. In this case your payoff will be DM .
4. If   , you will keep the lottery and participate in it. It will be played by you by throwing the die once [twice].
In this case you will receive the payoff of the lottery as described above.
The decision is made on a separate form, which we will soon hand out to all participants.
You will receive a code-number to keep your anonymity towards us. Please keep your code-card carefully, because you
will later receive your payment only when presenting it.
Instructions for Treatment C.
Welcome to our experiment! Please read these instructions carefully! Do not talk to your neighbours and keep quiet
during the entire experiment. If you have a question, give notice. We will then come to you.
In this experiment you will have to make a few decisions. How much money you will finally earn depends on your
own decisions as well as on chance moves.
You have the opportunity to participate in a lottery which pays in periods 1 and 2 either DM 5.00 or DM 1.00. How is
decided which of the payoffs the lottery generates in both periods?
You will throw a die twice.
 You win DM 5.00 each time the die shows an even number.
 You win DM 1.00 each time the die shows an odd number.
You can now keep the lottery and participate in it or you can sell it to us (the experimenters).
How can you sell the lottery, in case you want to?
In the first place you can sell the lottery as a whole. To do this you have to determine a lower price limit  ( has to
lie between DM 1.00 and DM 10.00). You will sell the entire lottery at a randomly chosen price , if  is larger than
your price limit . Otherwise you will keep the lottery and participate in it by throwing the die once. The price  will
be randomly selected from the set of all prices:
    
If you have not sold the entire lottery, you can again sell your payoff claims from the second throw of the die. This
follows according to the same procedure as above.
Please note that your price limit  does not determine the price at which you sell the entire lottery (respectively your
payoff claims from the second throw of the die), but the interval (    DM 10.00) of prices , for which you
are willing to sell the entire lottery (respectively your payoff claims from the second throw of the die). Therefore, the
price limit optimal for you is the price , at which selling and not selling the lottery appears equally favourable.
Please note further that by choosing  DM 10.00 you can ensure keeping your payoff claims from each throw of the
die independent of the randomly drawn price. In contrast to this you can ensure to sell the entire lottery (respectively
your payoff claims from the second throw of the die) in any case by the choice of   DM 1.00.
For a better understanding of the rules the sequence of events is listed again:
1. You determine your lower price limit  for the entire lottery.
(As explained above, this is the price limit above which you are willing to sell the entire lottery to us.
2. The price  is randomly selected.
(For this purpose, somebody will grab into a bowl with chips. The chips carry the prices as listed under .)
3. If   , you will sell the entire lottery to us. In this case your payoff will be DM  and the experiment ends.
4. If   , you will keep the lottery and participate in it and the experiment will be continued. The first period of
the lottery will be played by you by throwing the die once. The respective payoff is your profit of the first period.
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5. You can now sell your payoff claims from the second throw of the die by again determining a lower price limit .
6. A second price  is randomly determined.
7. If    you will sell your payoff claims from the second throw of the die. In this case your payment is DM 
plus your profits from the first period.
8. If    you will keep your payoff claims from the second throw of the die. The second period of the lottery is
then played by you throwing the die again. Your payment is then the sum of the respective profits from the first
and the second throw of the die.
The decision(s) are made on a separate form, which we will soon hand out to all participants. You will receive a code-
number to keep your anonymity towards us. Please keep your code-card carefully, because you will later receive your
payment only when presenting it.
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A.2 Data
1. Between-subjects treatments
Treatment A Treatment B
first round second round
subject bid bid
1 5.00 6.00
2 8.00 6.00
3 7.90 7.50
4 5.50 5.50
5 6.00 6.00
6 5.40 6.80
7 7.99 7.99
8 4.90 10.00
9 5.00 5.00
10 4.00 3.00
a-11 1.00 10.00
a-12 7.50 7.50
a-13 8.00 8.00
a-14 6.00 6.00
a-15 7.00 5.00
a-16 5.50 4.50
a-17 8.00 8.00
a-18 6.90 6.90
a-19 6.00 5.00
a-20 4.50 3.20
a-21 7.00 5.60
a-22 5.50 5.00
a-23 6.00 6.00
a-24 6.50 7.50
a-25 3.50 6.30
a-26 5.50 5.50
a-27 6.00 2.70
a-28 6.00 9.50
a-29 9.00 8.00
a-30 7.49 7.40
a-31 5.00 6.00
a-32 5.90 5.90
a-33 5.00 4.00
a-34 5.00 5.00
a-35 6.80 7.20
a-36 6.00 6.00
a-37 6.40 6.40
a-38 8.00 8.00
a-39 10.00 10.00
a-40 6.00 3.00
first round second round
subject bid bid
1 10.00 10.00
2 5.00 5.00
4 6.00 6.00
5 6.50 7.00
6 6.00 6.00
7 6.00 6.00
8 6.00 6.00
9 6.00 5.00
10 4.00 4.50
b-11 4.90 1.00
b-12 8.00 6.00
b-13 6.00 6.00
b-14 6.10 6.10
b-15 8.00 6.00
b-16 5.99 5.99
b-17 6.00 6.00
b-18 2.90 3.00
b-19 6.00 6.00
b-20 6.00 6.00
b-21 6.00 6.00
b-22 5.90 5.90
b-23 6.00 6.00
b-24 7.00 7.00
b-25 6.10 3.90
b-26 4.00 4.00
b-27 6.00 6.00
b-28 6.00 10.00
b-29 8.00 8.00
b-30 6.70 7.20
b-31 5.10 7.00
b-32 5.50 5.50
b-33 5.00 5.00
b-34 5.90 5.90
b-35 5.90 5.90
b-36 6.00 6.00
b-37 5.90 6.00
b-38 8.40 7.50
b-39 6.00 7.00
b-40 7.00 6.70
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Treatment C
first round second round
subject bid 1 prize 1 bid 2 prize 2 bid 1 prize 1 bid 2 prize 2
c-1 6.10 - - - 6.10 - - -
c-2 7.00 - - - 7.90 - - -
c-4 5.90 - - - 8.90 - - -
c-5 6.91 - - - 7.39 - - -
c-6 8.50  7.40  8.50 - - -
c-7 6.90 - - - 8.00 - - -
c-8 6.00 - - - 6.00 - - -
c-9 6.00 - - - 5.00 - - -
c-10 9.00  5.00  7.00 - - -
c-11 9.90  1.00  9.90  1.80 
c-12 6.00 - - - 6.50 - - -
c-13 8.00  4.00  8.00 - - -
c-14 8.00  5.00  8.00 - - -
c-15 8.50  5.00  7.50 - - -
c-16 6.00 - - - 6.00 - - -
c-17 8.00  4.40  10.00  2.40 
c-18 6.00  3.00  6.00  3.00 
c-19 8.60  4.50  7.50  6.60 
c-20 8.00  4.00  8.00  4.00 
c-21 8.50  4.50  8.50  5.00 
c-22 6.00  3.00  6.00  3.00 
c-23 7.50  7.50  7.50  4.00 
c-24 5.00  5.00  5.00  5.00 
c-25 5.10  4.90  5.20  1.10 
c-26 7.50  2.50  7.00  3.00 
c-27 7.50  6.00  9.00  2.50 
c-28 5.90  3.00  5.90  4.90 
c-29 8.00  4.00  9.00  3.70 
c-30 6.00  2.50  6.00  2.50 
c-31 5.90  4.90  8.90  4.00 
c-32 6.00  3.00  6.00  3.00 
c-33 7.00  6.00  8.00  5.00 
c-34 9.90  5.90  10.00  5.00 
c-35 9.00  3.10  9.00  3.10 
c-36 7.80  5.00  8.00  5.00 
c-37 8.00  5.00  3.50  6.50 
c-38 8.00  5.00  8.00  5.00 
c-39 9.90  4.90  9.90  4.90 
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2. Within-subjects treatments
Group 1
first round second round
subject bid A bid B bid C1 prize 1 bid C2 prize 2 bid A bid B bid C1 prize 1 bid C2 prize 2
1 5.00 5.00 9.00  5.00  3.00 1.00 6.00  5.00 
2 5.00 6.00 9.00  4.00  10.00 6.00 6.00  5.00 
3 5.10 6.10 6.10  3.20  4.00 4.00 6.00  3.00 
4 8.40 7.60 8.90  4.00  6.00 6.00 8.00  6.00 
5 6.50 6.00 10.00  4.00  5.00 6.00 9.00  3.00 
6 6.00 7.00 8.00  4.90  6.00 7.00 8.00  4.90 
7 6.00 6.80 6.00  2.60  5.80 6.80 6.50  2.90 
8 5.00 10.00 10.00  5.00  10.00 4.80 6.70  5.70 
9 7.50 7.00 9.80  5.50  6.00 6.00 9.50  6.50 
10 5.00 10.00 7.50  7.50  5.00 7.00 6.20  6.80 
11 5.00 9.80 9.80  8.20  6.90 7.40 8.40  8.40 
12 5.00 7.00 9.90  4.90  7.00 6.50 9.90  5.00 
13 6.00 6.00 9.00  3.00  6.00 6.00 9.00  3.00 
14 2.50 5.00 6.00  5.00  5.50 6.00 6.50  - -
15 5.00 6.00 10.00  5.00  5.00 6.00 10.00  5.00 
16 8.00 8.00 9.00  8.00  8.00 8.00 9.00  7.00 
17 10.00 1.00 8.50  5.00  7.50 8.00 8.50  6.00 
18 5.10 5.90 8.50  6.00  5.10 5.60 8.20  5.60 
19 8.00 8.00 7.00  5.00  6.00 6.00 8.00  5.00 
20 9.00 6.00 6.00  4.00  5.00 5.00 5.00  - -
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Group 2
first round second round
subject bid A bid B bid C1 prize 1 bid C2 prize 2 bid A bid B bid C1 prize 1 bid C2 prize 2
1 6.00 6.00 6.00  3.00  6.00 6.00 6.00  - -
2 6.00 6.00 6.00  3.00  6.00 6.00 6.00  - -
3 8.00 8.00 8.00  8.00  8.00 8.00 8.00  8.00 
4 6.50 6.80 8.00  4.00  5.00 8.00 8.00  4.00 
5 6.00 6.00 10.00  6.00  6.00 6.00 10.00  6.00 
6 10.00 10.00 10.00  10.00  10.00 10.00 10.00  10.00 
7 6.80 6.80 7.20  7.20  6.90 7.20 7.50  4.80 
8 5.10 5.10 5.00  4.00  5.10 5.10 5.10  - -
9 7.00 7.00 7.00  3.00  7.00 7.00 7.00  - -
10 6.00 6.00 6.00  6.00  6.00 6.00 6.00  - -
11 6.00 6.00 8.00  6.00  6.00 6.00 8.00  5.00 
12 5.90 5.00 5.90  5.00  5.80 5.00 5.90  - -
13 7.50 7.50 7.00  3.50  6.00 6.00 6.50  - -
14 6.59 7.99 7.99  7.99  4.99 7.99 7.99  7.49 
15 7.00 7.00 8.00  1.00  7.00 7.00 10.00  1.00 
16 6.50 6.50 6.50  6.00  6.50 6.50 6.50  - -
17 5.50 6.00 6.90  3.30  6.90 6.00 4.00  - -
18 7.81 4.71 9.80  6.11  10.00 6.61 6.21  - -
19 4.90 4.70 4.70  5.00  5.00 5.00 5.00  - -
20 6.80 6.80 6.80  5.00  6.80 6.80 6.80  - -
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